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IN THE SUPREME COURI' OF THE STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH I
Plaintiff-Respondent,

vs.
Case No. 15804

KENNETH EUGENE G01'FREY I

Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE

This is a criminal proceeding brought by the State of Utah
against Kenneth Eugene Gotfrey charging him with one oount of Forcible
Sodany, two counts of Rape, and two oounts of Forcible SWxual Abuse in
violation of sections 76-5-403, 76-5-402, and 76-5-404 Utah Code Annotated 1953, as arrended.

DISPOSITION IN THE IrnER COURI'
The defendant was found guilty in the District Court of the
Seventh Judicial District in and for Carbon County, State of Utah, on
March 21, 1978, after a jury trial, of Forcible Sod.any and two counts
of Rape.

The Defendant waived time for pronounc:errent of judgrrent and

the Court on March 21, 1978 sentenced the Defendant to serve a term

of 1-15

years on Count I, Forcible Sodomy, and two terms of 5 years

to life for Rape on Counts II and III, all sentences to run oon=rently.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks an Order of this Court reversing the

judgme~

and verdict rendered at trial and a ruling remanding the cause

tot~

Trial Court for a new trial.

STATEMENT OF F/.\CTS
At trial Michael Gene Garcia, a sixteen year old step-son of tne
defendant, testified that he was deer hunting with defendant on October
Michael and the defendant and a youn~

23, l 976, in Carbon County, Utah.

cousin of Michael were sleeping in a tent when Michael was awakened by
defendant's hand over his mouth. (T. 51).

The Defendant then took down

Michael's pants, ordered Michael to be quiet, and then placed hismoutn
over Michael's sexual organ. (T. 51).

Michael stated that he did not

do

this willingly but that the defendant held him so that he couldn't get
up. (T. 51).

On cross-examination Michael testified that a cousin was

in the tent at the time (T. 55, 67, 68) and that an Uncle and four to
six friends of the uncle were outside around a campfire approximately
fifteen to twenty feet away at the time of the attack. (T. 56).
On direct examination Defendant admitted that he was deer huntin~
with Michael of October 23, 1976, but denied that he attacked Mi~~l oo
that date or any other time. (T. 159, 160).
With regard to Count II, Petrita Garcia, a step-daughter of the
defendant, tes ti fi ed that she was raped by the Defendant approximately
twenty to fifty times, and in particular, on September 11, 1975, while
she was twelve years old.

The attack allegedly took place in the familY

mobile home at We 11 i ngton, Utah while the mother was in the hos pita 1·
(T. 6, 7).

Petrita fUrther testified that she never told anyone that she
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With respect to Count III, Rosie Garcia testified that she was
a step-daughter of the defendant and that he raped her in their mobile
home at Wellington, Utah on March 15, 1977, while she was then twelve
years old and while her mother was away at church. (T. 20, 21).
also testified that she had

She

had intercourse with the Defendant on

forty to fifty occasions. (T. 23, 25).
On direct examination the Defendant denied any acts of abuse or
intercourse with either Petrita or Rosie. (T. 164).
POINTS ON APPEAL
POINT I
THE EVIDENCE WAS NOT SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE VERDICTS.
The Defendant contends that the conviction of the Defendant of
Forcible Sodomy and two counts of Rape is not supported by the evidence.
A. The conviction for Forcible Sodomy.

The testimony of the

alleged victim, Michael Gene Garcia, was incredible, suspicious, and
inherently contradictory.

The victim would have the jury believe that the

Defendant committed ant of Sodomy upon him while deer hunting on October
23, 1976. (T. 51)

This supposedly occurred in the presence of a cousin

of Michael who was sleeping at his feet. (T. 68).

The victim even contends

that he was being attacked while he was kicking the cousin to awaken him.
(T. 68).
Michael also testified that there were at least four to six other
adults around a campfire fifteen to twenty feet away.

(T. 59, 67).

It

would indeed seem incredible that the victim of a reprehensible attack
would remain mute when assistance was so readily available.
The testimony of Michael was also inconsistent and contradicted
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a previous statement made to a juvenile probation officer, Brian Matsu~;
Mr. Matsuda, cal led as awitness by the plaintiff, testified on cross.
examination that Michael- Garcia had told him on June 24, 1977, that the
Defendant had attacked Michael while deer hunting by forcing Michael to
pl ace his mouth upon the sexual organ of the Defendant. (T. 97). Mr.
Matsuda also testified that there was no misunderstanding as to
Michael related the facts of the alleged Sodomy.

(T. 100, 101).

h~

Yet

Michael testified on direct examination that the Sodomy consisted of tn;
Defendant p 1 acing his mouth upon the sexua 1 organ of Mi cha el. (T. 51, ol
So gross an inconsistency as to who performed the act upon

w~m

certainly raises suspicion as to whether the attack ever occurred and
further renders the events testified to by Michael Garcia incredible.

JI

very nature of this type of an attack suggests that it is an act not per·
formed in the near presence of persons who might discover the activity.
One further wonders why, if the attack occurred, no effective resistance
was offered.

The victim testified that he dared not yell for help (U1'.

but yet he dared to kick his cousin for help. (T.68).
It is clear from the record that Michael harbored considerable
animosity toward the Defendant and it is not beyond belief that Michael
would falsely accuse the Defendant of a detestable offense.
Mr. James Still, prior to trial, that "I'm

(T. 144).

Michael toli

setting up my stepfather."

Michael also told Mr. Toby Vigil that he would have his rela·

ti ves take care of the Defendant if the Defendant were sent to prison.
(T. 149).

It also appears that Michael was selling personal property

belonging to the Defendant during the time the Defendant was incarcero
ated pending trial. (T. 133).

Michael himself tesitified that he had

held a .22 rifle on his stepfather (T. 60,61), that they had numerous
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arguments (T. 60), that they had fist fights (T. 60), and that they had
a conflict over a girl friend of Michael sleeping at Defendant's home.
(T.73).
In view of the conflict existing between the Defendant and Michael
the testimony of Michael becomes more suspicious in view of the significant inconsistent statement previously referred to.
B.

The Conviction for Rape.

The testimony of Rosie and Petrita

Garcia to the effect that they had been raped by the Defendant was incredible
and suspicious.

At the time the attack on Petrita allegedly took place on

Sept. 11, 1975, the victim was at home with her two sisters who were
watching TV. (T. 9, 11).

Even though one of the sisters knew the attack

was taking place she did not attempt to go for help to anyone else in the
trailer court. (T. 13).

Petrita also testified that similar attacks had

previously occurred on twenty to fifty occasions. (T. 7)

Yet none of the

attacks were reported to anyone, not even the mother. (T. 14)
Rosie Garcia testified that she had been raped by the Defendant on
March 15, 1977 in their ·mobile hime while the mother was away at church.
(T. 21).

She further testified that the Defendant had raped her ·On 40-

50 other occasions (T. 25) but that she told no one except a friend named
Darla. (T. 30).

She further testified that many of the other attacks

took place in the presence of a sister (T. 25)and while the mother was at
home. (T. 24).

Yet the mother, Mrs. Rosie Gotfrey, testified that she never

suspected or had reason to suspect that any type of an illicit on-going
relationship existed between the Defendant and Rosie and Petrita. (T. 40).
It strains the imagination to believe that the Defendant could have
raped each girl up to fifty times, many
5

whil~

the mother was at home, and
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in the presence of another sister, without arousing the suspicion of Uie
mother.

I

One questions whether the attacks actually occurred if they weri

not reported to the mother until June of 1977. (L 40).

In particular,

the remoteness of the supposed attack on Sept. 11, 1975, from the date 11
was reported seriously detracts from the credibility of the story presen\' I
by Petrita.
It is also significant to note that the attack upon Petrita on
September· 11, 1975, was not corroborated by Rosie Garcia who was at

ho~

at the time and supposedly had knowledge of the attack. (T.12).
By way of summary, the stories of the three victims are incredioi1
and suspicious.

Defendant submits that because of the inherent improbaoil

of the stories the verdicts were not supported by the evidence. The con·
viction should "be scrutinized with great care

because it is a charge fo

to make and hard to defend against" , a principle with which this Courti;I
in accord.

State v. Ward, 10 Utah 2d 34, 347 P.2d 865 at 868, (Utah 195~)

POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S CLAIM OF A PSYCHOLOG!Sl·

1

I

PATIENT PRIVILEGE.
Bobby Joe Fredrickson was called as a witness by the Plaintiff. IL
He testified that he was a clinical psychologist at Four Corners Mental
Health in Price and in that capacity had a therapy contact with the Oefen~!
on July l, 1977.

(T. llO, 111, 117)

Over Defendant's objection the Trial
d ni·
·court permitted Mr. Fredrickson to testify that the Defendant had tol

that the Defendant had had sexual intercourse with his two daughters. (T. ··
.
tremelY
Defendant contends this testimony by Mr. Fredrick son was ex
·
6 by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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prejudicial and that the psychologist-patient privilege is applicable in
this situation.

Accordingly, the Trial Court should have sustained the

objection to the testimony of Mr. Fredrickson. {T. 111).
The statutory privilege claimed by Defendant is set forth in
Section 58-25-8 Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended:
A psychologist licensed under the provisions of this act
cannot, without the consent of his client or patient, be
examined in a civil or criminal action as to any information acquired in the course of his professional services
in behalf of the client . . .
Although Mr. Fredrickson did not obtain a license pursuant to the procedure set forth in the Act at Section 58-25-2 {T. 110, 111), he was a
clinical psychologist employed by a governmental agency, Four Corners
Mental Health.

The Act, however, exempts a psychologist from the licensing

requirements if he is employed as a psychologist by a governmental agency:
.... No person may represent himself to be a psychologist
unless he is licensed under the provisions of this act or
exempted under the provisions of 58-25-6.
Sec. 58-25-5, Utah Code Annotated
And Section 58-25-6, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, provides:
Nothing in this Act shall be construed to limit the activities,
and use of official titles on the part of a person in the employ of a federal, state, county, or municipal agency, or other
political subdivision, . . . , in so far that such activities
and services are a part of the duties in his salaried position,
and in so far that such activities or services are performed
solely on behalf of his employer.
It is apparent that Mr. Fredrickson clearly falls within the exception of ·Section 58- 25-6 since he is an employee of Four Corners Mental
Health and that he therefore is exempted from the licensing requirements of
the act.

Inasmuch as the exempted psychologist is allowed to engage in

substantially the same duties and activities as the licensed psychologist,
there appears no logical reason why the privilege should not apply in the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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opposed to one in private practice.

In this particular instance the

Defendant was engaging in therapy much the same as if he had consulted
a psychologist in private practice.

A person willing to enter in to

i

u,,l

ought to be able to do so, feeling that his conversations will be held
confidential.

It would seem that this is especially true where a goverri·

menta 1 agency holds itself out as being a mental health center and ther;
clothes itself with the appearance of being a

quasi-medica~

body. The

very concept of a mental health clinic implies that there be honest and
accurate communication between psychologist and patient.

If the privilc:

is not extended to those psychologists working for a governmental agenq
the free flow of communication theory will be thwarted and the conceptof
honesty between psychologist and patient suffers a chilling effect. Nol!
that even Mr. Fredrickson was under the impression that the therapy se11ic
was confidential.

(T. 114).
I

It would also seem proper to uphold the privilege of psychologi1 1·1
patient in this instance

on an agency theory,i .e. ,that if a certifiedor

licensed psychologist referred the patient to another psychologist inili
Four Corners Mental Health Center the credentials of the ref error oughtt
the
fl ow to psycho l gist to whom the patient was referred. To not so hold wo1':
place upon the patient the burden of determining the qualifications ofeli'
person with whom he engages in therapy contact.

This principle is import!

in the case at bar for the reason that Mr. Fredrickson testified ~~W
Defendant was referred by Mr. Fredrickson's supervisor. (T.

121) andtt!:

four or five other psychologists had been working with the Defendant.(\.
This in itself would place an impermissible burden on the Defendant to
determine what things he would be able to discuss with which psychologii'
the Services
Defendan:
Sponsored by the S.J.
Quinney Law
for digitization
by the Institute
of MuseumSince
and Library
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appears to have had contact with at least two licensed psychologists at
the Four Corners Mental Health Center (T. 113, 114), it would seem only
in fair play to allow the defendant to expect that his confidences with
each therapist would receive equal dignity and protection under the law.

POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO STRIKE
COUNT I FROM THE COMPLAINT AND IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO QUASH.
At the time of Arraignment on December 21, 1977, Defendant moved
to quash the Information upon the grounds that it charged more than one
offense in violation of Section 77-23-3 (l) (g).

It should be noted here

that the Information charged one Count of Forcible Sodomy, two counts of
Rape, and two Counts of Forcible Sexual Abuse.

The Motion was denied

and overruled. (Minute entry of Dec. 21, 1977, located at Minute Book No.
16, page 32.

Excerpt therefrom attached to Court file).

At the com-

mencement of trial on March 20, 1978, Defendant moved to Strike Count I,
Forcible Sodomy, from the Information for the reason that it would unduly
prejudice the defendant and deprive him of a fair trial to try a sodomy
case concurrently with two counts of Rape.

The motion was denied and

overruled.
Section 77-23-3, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, provides:
A Motion to Quash the Information or Indictment shall be
available only on one or more of the following grounds.
In the case of:
(l) Either an information of indictment:
(g) That there is more than one offense charged except
as provided in section 77-21-31 of this Code.
There can be no dispute that more than one offense was charged in
the information.

The issue is whether the multiple charges are permissible

under
Section
77-21-31.
provides:
Sponsored
by the
S.J. Quinney
Law Library. Said
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Two. ofr moret. off~nses may be charged in the same indictment !
or in orma ion in a separate count for each offense if t·,
offenses charged, whether felonies or misdemeanors orb
are of simi ~ ar character or are based on two or more ac~i'
or transact1 ons or on two. or . more acts or transactions con.
nee t e d t oge th er or cons t l tut mg parts of a common scheme , !
pl an.
o, ,

tt

Defendant contends that Forcible Sodomy is an offense not simila·I
in character and not based on the same act or transaction as the two
charges contained in the information.

Rae'

Nor was the Sodomy count connecte:

together with the Rape offenses or Sexual Abuse offenses as part of a
common scheme oll" plan.

Accordingly, the Motion to Quash should havebeir

sustained.
It is clear that rape and sodomy are separate and distinct offeni:
each having its own elements.

One is not included within the other.

legislature saw fit to distinguish the offense of rape from

111:

soda~~~

each offense its own definition, established different elements, prescrit;l
different penalties, and gave each offense its own section number. Nott:I
be overlooked is the gross perversion usually ascribed to sodomy as dis·
tinguished from the offense of rape.

1

The greatest dissimilarity between

the two offenses would be that the offense of rape can only be cormnittea I
by a male person upon a female while the offense of sodomy could be com·
mitted by either male or female upon another person regardless of gender
In the instant case the information itself shows that the Count!
offense of Forcible Sodomy, alleged to have occurred on October 23, 1910 '
was remote in time and place from the two counts of rape alleged to have,
occurred on September 11 , 1975, and March 15, 1977.

The inf omation

cha~~1

that three different victims were involved and that they all occurred at
considerably different times and places.

This remoteness would seem to
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negate the assertion in this case of the rapes and sodomy being connected
together or constituting parts of a common scheme or plan.

Defendant

submits that there is no evidence in the record to show that any forethought
or planning was involved in the alleged commission of any of the offenses.
Further, the record is devoid of any evidence of a scheme or plan which
would tend to link the offenses together.
The effect of the misjoinder is to prejudice the defendant in the
eyes of the jury when he is tried in the same action for offenses which
bear no reasonable relationship to each other.

The jury could not help

but be unduly influenced against the defendant during the testimony of
Rosie Garcia and Petrita Garcia, having previously heard the information
read to them alleging a count of sodomy ..
In State v. Sanchez, 511 P.2d 1231 (Or. 1973), an Oregon statute
permitted charging several crimes in a single indictment when they arose
from "the same act or transaction." The Oregon Supreme Court held that
in view of a previous case, State v. Brown, 497 P.2d 1191 (Or. 1972), two
or more crimes are part of a single transaction when they are closely
linked in time, place and circumstances.

The Court stated in Sanchez:

But even assuming the murder and robberies are one
transaction, we perceive no basis for including the
crime of theft in that transaction. That crime was
committed hours after- the murder and blocks away.
There is no overlap between the evidence of the murder and robberies on the one hand, and the theft on
the other hand. Accordingly, we conclude that at
least the theft charge was improperly joined with
511 P. 2d at 1234.
the other counts.
Applying the principle of Sanchez to the instant case it is clear
that there is no overlap of evidence between the sodomy charge and the
two counts of rape.
the offense

of.'J9Q~~

None of the testimony of Michael Garcia regarding
had any relationship to the rape offenses.
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The Oregon Court found two different transactions when they were cormnr"
'•.,

blocks away from each other and hours apart.

In the case at bar the 0i'

were months and even more than a year apart and committed mil es from ei
other.
Consider also State v. Weitzel, 69 P.2d 958 (Or. 1937), whereir
Oregon Supreme Court stated:
Appellants complain of the admission in evidence of the fo11
and circumstances surrounding the attempted rape. It is ass;
that such evidence hs no relevancy to the charge of sodomy. i
law is well settled that, when several criminal acts are 50
connected with the defendant, with respect to time and local::,
that they form an inseparable transaction, and a complete a(t
of the offense charged in the indictment cannot be given wrn:
detailing the particulars of such other acts, evidence oU
entire transaction is admissible, even though it may disclo11
the commission of another crime. . .
69 P. 2d at 963.
The danger hinted at in Weitzel is that separate charges

~id~

are not connected in time and locality may well have no substantial rel1·
vancy to each other .

One would therefore not be admissible against Ute

since that would violate the general rule that evidence of other crim~
not admissible.

Since the crimes of sodomy and rape are not similar a~I'

light of the fact that they bore no reasonable relation to each otheri~
time or place the Court should have sustained the Motion to Quash, and
failing that, granted Defendant's Motion to Strike Count I and ordert~al
it be tried in a separate action.

CONCLUSION
The verdicts and judgments pronounced upon the Defendant should
be reversed and the cause remanded back to the Tri a 1 Court for a new
trial for the reasons set forth in the preceding Points I, II and III.

12
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Respectfully submitted,

~~K~
BRYCE K. BRYNER
155 So. Main
Helper, Utah 84526
Attorney for Appellant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, BRYCE K. BRYNER, hereby certify I personally served three (3) copies
of the above and foregoing

BRIEF OF APPELLANT upon Robert B. Hansen,

Attorney General of the State of Utah, by personally delivering said
three copies to the Office of the Attorney General at 236 State Capitol,
Salt Lake City, Utah, this 28th day of August, 1978.
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